Kentucky Law Survey: Torts by Adams, Katherine A.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 73 | Issue 2 Article 10
1984
Kentucky Law Survey: Torts
Katherine A. Adams
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons, and the Torts Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Special Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law
Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Adams, Katherine A. (1984) "Kentucky Law Survey: Torts," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 73 : Iss. 2 , Article 10.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol73/iss2/10
Torts
By KATHERINE A. ADAMs*
INTRODUCTION
The Kentucky courts have recently decided several significant
cases in the area of torts. This Survey will address decisions
involving comparative negligence,' strict products liability,2 ap-
parent authority in medical malpractice, 3 damages for future
mental suffering, 4 and the applicability of the fireman's rule to
police officers.'
I. COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
With the decision in Hilen v. Hayes,6 Kentucky became the
forty-second state in the nation to abandon the contributory
negligence defense and adopt comparative negligence. 7 Com-
parative negligence is the concept that in any negligence action
liability should be imposed in direct relation to fault.8 The
doctrine, which is often said to be based on fundamental fair-
ness, 9 has replaced contributory negligence as the majority rule
in the United States.'
0
* J.D. Candidate, University of Kentucky, 1985. The author expresses her appre-
ciation to Richard C. Ausness, Professor of Law, for his assistance in the preparation
of this survey.
I Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1984).
2 Montgomery Elevator Co. v. McCullough, 676 S.W.2d 776 (Ky. 1984); American
Motors Corp. v. Addington, No. 82-CA-2624-MR (Ky. Ct. App. July 13, 1984), modi-
fied, 31 KY. L. SuMm. 10, at 20 (July 13, 1984) [hereinafter cited as KLS].
Williams v. St. Claire Med. Ctr., 657 S.W.2d 590 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
4 Davis v. Graviss, 672 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1984).
Fletcher v. Illinois Cent. G.R.R., 679 S.W.2d 240 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
6 673 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1984).
See notes 36-41 infra and accompanying text.
'E.g., V. ScnwARTz, COMPARATrVE NEGLIGENCE § 2.1 (1974). The concept of
comparative negligence predates the concept of contributory negligence. Comparative
negligence was part of Roman law by 533 A.D., and some legal scholars believe the
concept has a much earlier origin. See H. WOODS, CoMPARATIV FAULT § 1:9 (1978);
Mole & Wilson, A Study of Comparative Negligence, 17 CORNELL L.Q. 333, 337 (1931-
32). But see Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 CH.[-]KENT L. REv. 189,
216-18 (1949-50).
9 See, e.g., Scott v. Rizzo, 634 P.2d 1234, 1236 (N.M. 1981) ("comparative
negligence more equitably apportions damages").
10 See notes 36-41 infra. For recent Kentucky articles on comparative negligence,
see Bagby, Contributory Negligence on the Decline, 46 Ky. BENCH & B. 8 (1982); Rogers
& Shaw, A Comparative Negligence Checklist to Avoid Future Unnecessary Litigation,
72 Ky. L.J. 25 (1983-84); White, The Doctrine of Comparative Negligence Should Be
Adopted in Kentucky, I1 N. Ky. L. Rav. 37 (1984).
481
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A. The History of Contributory Negligence
Contributory negligence itself is a fairly recent development
in tort law. Its beginnings are generally traced" to an 1809
English case, Butterfield v. Forrester.12 In Butterfield, the court
stated that the plaintiff could recover from the defendant only
if there were "no want of ordinary care to avoid [being harmed
by defendant's negligence] on the part of the plaintiff.'
3
The first American application of contributory negligence
was not until 1824,14 when the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court held that a plaintiff could not recover unless he could
show that he had used ordinary care. 5 Kentucky first 6 applied
the doctrine of contributory negligence in the 1892 case, Newport
News & M. V.R. Co. v. Dauser.17 The Kentucky court held: "[Ihf
the plaintiff so far contributed to the injury that but for his
contributory negligence the injury would not have been received,
he cannot recover . .
Contributory negligence has been harshly criticized as an
"all or nothing" proposition that unfairly denies recovery to the
plaintiff. 19 It has also been suggested that jurors ignore or delib-
erately violate the rule in order to allow a slightly negligent
" See, e.g., H. WOODS, supra note 8, at § 1:3. One reason given for the adoption
of the doctrine of contributory negligence in England and America was to protect the
fledgling industrial revolution by imposing a duty of self protection on individuals. See
id. at § 1:4.
,1 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809). In Butterfield, the plaintiff had been riding his horse
at a hard pace when he struck a pole the defendant had placed across part of a public
road. The jury was instructed to find for the defendant that the plaintiff could have
discovered the obstacle by use of ordinary care. The jury found for the defendant, and
that decision was affirmed on appeal. Id. at 927.
'31d. at 927.
" See H. WOODS, supra note 8, at § 1:3.
,1 See Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 621, 624 (1824).
16 See Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713, 714 (Ky. 1984).
17 13 Ky. L. Rep. 734 (Ky. Super. Ct. 1892).
is Id.
19 The United States Supreme Court has stated:
The harsh rule of the common law under which contributory negligence
wholly barred an injured person from recovery is completely incompatible
with modern admiralty policy and procedure. . . .Petitioner presents no
persuasive arguments that admiralty should now adopt a discredited doc-
trine which automatically destroys all claims of injured persons who have
contributed to their injuries in any degree, however slight.
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 408-09 (1953).
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plaintiff to recover. 20 Attempting to avoid the harshness of con-
tributory negligence, courts have fashioned several exceptions to
the doctrine,2' including the doctrine of "last clear chance," the
irrelevance of contributory negligence where the defendant's acts
were deliberate, wanton or willful, and the rule that young
children are incapable of contributory negligence. 22 Although
limiting the reach of contributory negligence, these makeshift
remedies failed to overcome the doctrine's fundamental unfair-
ness .23
B. Development of Comparative Negligence
Following English precedent, American courts have long ap-
plied comparative negligence in admiralty cases. 24 However, com-
parative negligence made little advancement into other areas of
law in this country until Congress passed the Federal Employee's
Liability Act (FELA) in 1908.25 The FELA provided for appli-
cation of comparative negligence in actions brought by injured
railway employees. 26 With this Congressional lead, some thirty
states subsequently adopted comparative negligence statutes that
were limited to railroad accidents. 27 These statutes were enacted
in reaction to the harsh treatment accorded injured railroad
10 See W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 67, at 469 (5th
ed. 1984) ("[Jiuries are notoriously inclined to find that there has been no such negligence
or to make some more or less haphazard reduction of the plaintiff's damages in
proportion to his fault.").
2 See id. at 460; V. ScHwARTz, supra note 8, at §§ 5.3, 7.1.
22 E.g., V. ScHwARTz, supra note 8, at §§ 5.3, 7.1. Each of these exceptions is
recognized in Kentucky. See, e.g., General Tel. Co. of Ky. v. Yount, 482 S.W.2d 567,
568 (Ky. 1972) (last clear chance doctrine is designed to soften the harsh effects of
contributory negligence and allow helpless plaintiffs to recover); Wheeler v. Creekmore,
469 S.W.2d 559, 561 (Ky. 1971) (contributory negligence not available as a defense if
defendant guilty of wanton negligence); Basham v. White, 298 S.W.2d 316, 317 (Ky.
1957) (contributory negligence not available to defendant who intentionally causes harm);
Dykes v. Alexander, 411 S.W.2d 47, 49 (Ky. 1967) (child under the age of seven incapable
of contributory negligence).
" "The attack upon contributory negligence has been founded upon the obvious
injustice of a rule which visits the entire loss caused by the fault of two parties on one
of them alone. . . ." Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d at 717 (citing Prosser, Comparative
Negligence, 51 MicH. L. REv. 465, 469 (1953)).
1, Turk, supra note 8, at 231.
2' V. ScHwARtz, supra note 8, at § 1.4.
16 Federal Employer's Liability Act, ch. 149, § 3, 35 Stat. 65, 66 (1908) (current
version at 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1976)).
2 V. ScnwARTz, supra note 8, at § 1.4.
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workers, and out of a desire to afford the workers greater
protection.
28
In 1910, the Mississippi legislature enacted the first true
comparative negligence statute 9 applicable to all suits for per-
sonal injury.3a Nebraska followed with a statute in 1913.31 Also
in 1913, the Georgia Supreme Court, in what has been termed
"a rather remarkable tour de force, ' 3 2 held that a statute ap-
plicable to railroad accidents would be given general applica-
tion. 33 The next statutory adoption was not until 1931, when
Wisconsin adopted 34 comparative negligence. 35 Eventually, thirty-
two states had statutorily adopted some form of comparative
negligence.1
6
In 1973, Florida became the first state to judicially adopt
comparative negligence3 7 in Hoffman v. Jones.38 The Florida
Turk, supra note 8, at 334.
1910 Miss. Laws 135 (current version at Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972)).
11 Turk, supra note 8, at 334.
1, See 1913 Neb. Laws 124 (current version at NEB. REV. STAT. § 25.1151 (Reissue
1979)).
32 W. KEETON, supra note 20, § 67, at 471.
13 Elk Cotton Mills v. Grant, 79 S.E. 836 (Ga. 1913).
14 See 1931 Wis. Laws 242 (current version at Wis. STAT. AN. § 895-045 (West
1983)). See also Padway, Comparative Negligence, 16 MARQ. L. REv. 3, 5 (1931-32)
(reprinting original act). The Wisconsin statute is regarded as the forerunner of most
modern modified comparative negligence statutes. H. WooDs, supra note 8, at § 1:11.
31 V. ScHwARTrz, supra note 8, at § 1.4.
36 ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to -1765 (1979); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111
(1973 & Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-572h to -572o (West 1983); GA.
CODE ANN. § 46-8-291 (Supp. 1982); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 663-31 (1976); IDAHO CODE
§§ 6-801 to -806 (1979); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-33-1 to -8 (Burns Supp. 1984); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 60-258a to -258b (1983); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2323 (West Supp.
1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (1964); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85
(Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 604.01-.02 (West Supp. 1984);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-702 to -703 (1983); NEi.
Ray. STAT. § 25-1151 (1979); NEV. RaV. STAT. § 41-141 (1979); N.H. Ry. STAT. ANN.
§ 507:7-a (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:15-5.1 to .3 (West Supp. 1984-85); N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. LAW § 1411 (McKinney 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1975); Omo REv.
CODE ANN. § 2315.19 (Page 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 13-14 (West Supp.
1983-84); OR. REv. STAT. § 18-470 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 7102 (Purdon 1982
& Supp. 1984-85); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-20-4 to -4.1 (Supp. 1983); S.D. Cosis. LAWS
ANN. § 20-9-2 (1979); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1984);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-37 to -43 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (Supp.
1983); WASH. RaV. CODE §§ 4.22.005-.920 (1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West
1983); Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-1-09 (Supp. 1984). See also P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 5141
(1968); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 1451 (Supp. 1983).
17 An Illinois appellate court had attempted a judicial adoption six years earlier
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court reasoned that legislative inaction did not preclude the
judiciary from changing a common law rule where changed
conditions and social and economic needs dictated. 39 The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court followed two years later in Li v. Yellow
Cab Co. 40 The trend continued and, by the early part of 1984,
nine states had judicially adopted some form of comparative
negligence.
4'
C. Hilen v. Hays
The Kentucky Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether
Kentucky would join the majority of states and adopt compar-
ative negligence in Hilen v. Hays.42 Margie Hilen and Keith Hays
were returning from a party where both had been drinking beer.
Each had also consumed a Quaalude .4  Neither Hilen nor Hays
believed that Hays was intoxicated or doubted his judgment.
4
No one at the party had attempted to prevent Hays from driv-
ing.45 On the way home, Hays drove his vehicle into the back
of another vehicle. 46 As a result of the accident, Margie lost fifty
percent of the movement in her neck. 47
In the subsequent lawsuit which Hilen brought against Hays,
the trial "judge directed a verdict as to [Hays'] negligence and
submitted the case to the jury solely on the issue of [Hilen's]
but was reversed on appeal. See Maki v. Frelk, 229 N.E.2d 284 (IIl. App. Ct. 1967),
rev'd, 239 N.E.2d 445 (Ill. 1968) (adoption more appropriately a legislative function).
See also W. KEETON, supra note 20, § 67 n.28; Symposium, Comments on Maki v.
Frelk, 21 VAND. L. REV. 889 (1968).
:8 280 So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1973).
1 See id. at 436.
- 532 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Cal. 1975).
41 See Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532
P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973); Alvis v. Ribar,
421 N.E.2d 886 (Ill. 1981); Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742 (Iowa 1982); Kirby
v. Larson, 256 N.W.2d 400 (Mich. 1977); Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo.
1983); Scott v. Rizzo, 634 P.2d 1234 (N.M. 1981); Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co.,
256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979).
,1 673 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1984).
41 Hilen v. Hays, No. 82-CA-2566-MR, slip op. at 1-2 (Ky. Ct. App. May 20,
1983), rev'd, 673 S.W.2d 713.
" Brief for Appellant Margie Hilen at 4, 673 S.W.2d 713.
" Id.
46 673 S.W.2d at 714.
41 Brief for Appellant Margie Hilen at 5, 673 S.W.2d 713.
1985]
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contributory negligence." ' 48 A unanimous jury found Hilen had
been contributorily negligent by getting into an automobile with
a driver she knew or should have known was intoxicated. 49 With
her damages award barred by the jury's finding, Hilen appealed,
urging that the jury should have been instructed to apply com-
parative negligence.50 The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court's decision and stated that it believed any adoption
of comparative negligence was a matter for the Supreme Court.
5
1
The Kentucky Supreme Court granted discretionary review to
decide whether the Commonwealth should adopt comparative
negligence.
52
D. Judicial Creation: The Court Has the Power
The initial issue before the Court was whether the judiciary
had the power to adopt comparative negligence. Nine state courts
that had faced the issue had declared that the change could be
made judicially. 3 Although other state courts had held that they
would defer to their state legislatures5 4 most of these courts had
merely stated that such an adoption was more appropriately a
legislative function, not that courts lacked the power to judicially
adopt comparative negligence.
55
Legal scholars have uniformly asserted that comparative neg-
ligence could and should be adopted judicially. 56 In support of
its own assumption of the power to act, the Kentucky Supreme
Court quoted from Dean Prosser: " '[Tihere never has been any
-1 673 S.W.2d at 714.
41 Brief for Appellant Margie Hilen at 1, 673 S.W.2d 713.
o No. 82-CA-2566-MR, slip op. at 2.
Id., slip op. at 2-3.
52 See 673 S.W.2d at 714. The Court had last considered this issue in 1970 and
had simply stated, "We have not adopted the comparative negligence doctrine in Ken-
tucky." Houchin v. Willow Ave. Realty Co., 453 S.W.2d 560, 563 (Ky. 1970).
11 See note 41 supra.
' See Golden v. McCurry, 392 So. 2d 815, 817 (Ala. 1980) (court has the power
but will defer to the legislature); Boies v. Cole, 407 P.2d 917, 921 (Ariz. 1965) (state's
constitution requires contributory negligence); McGraw v. Corrin, 303 A.2d 641, 644
(Del. Super. Ct. 1973) (adoption is a legislative function); Harrison v. Montgomery
County Bd. of Educ., 456 A.2d 894, 905 (Md. 1983) (properly addressed by the legisla-
ture).
's See, e.g., 392 So. 2d at 817. But see 303 A.2d at 644 (change can come only
from the legislature).
6 See, e.g., W. KEETON, supra note 20, at § 67.
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essential reason why the change could not be made without a
statute by the courts which made the contributory negligence
rule in the first place.' 157
The Court noted that neither was contributory negligence a
part of the laws of Virginia adopted by the Kentucky Constitu-
tion in 1792,58 nor had the Kentucky General Assembly chosen
to preempt the field by enacting specific legislation. 59 Although
some form of general comparative negligence legislation had
been frequently introduced since 1968, 60 the legislature had not
acted.
61
After reviewing the histories of contributory negligence and
comparative negligence and the lack of legislative preemption,
the Court concluded that it had the power to judicially adopt
comparative negligence. 62
E. Fundamental Fairness
Having determined that it had the authority to act, the Court
went on to address the issue of fundamental fairness. 63 The
17 673 S.W.2d at 716.
5' See Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713, 715 (Ky. 1984) (quoting Ky. CONST. § 233:
"All laws which, on the first day of June, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-two,
were in force in the State of Virginia, and which are of a general nature . . . shall be
in force within this State until they are altered or repealed by the General Assembly.").
19 Id. at 715. The Court did note that the legislature had enacted three statutes
with some bearing on the issue of fault: Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.320 (Bobbs-Merrill
Cum. Supp. 1984) (contributory negligence is a defense in a products liability case)
[hereinafter cited as KRS], KRS § 277.320 (comparative negligence applies to employee
actions not covered by the FELA), and KRS § 454.040 (jury may apportion liabilty
among defendants). See id.
60 The bills introduced include: S. 211, 1984 Reg. Sess.; S. 172, 1984 Reg. Sess.;
S. 270, 1982 Reg. Sess.; H.R. 480, 1982 Reg. Sess.; H.R. 617, 1980 Reg. Sess.; H.R.
599, 1976 Reg. Sess.; H.R. 90, 1974 Reg. Sess.; S. 349, 1972 Reg. Sess.; S. 26, 1968
Reg. Sess.; H.R. 63, 1968 Reg. Sess.
61 673 S.W.2d at 717. It has been argued that such legislative inaction manifests
an intent to retain contributory negligence. See Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886, 895 (Ill.
1981) (defendants argue General Assembly's failure to act evinces a desire to retain
current status). However, most commentators have asserted that such inaction merely
shows an inability to agree and conflicting lobbying efforts. See, e.g., Fleming, Forward:
Comparative Negligence at Law-By Judicial Choice, 64 CAti. L. REv. 239, 276-77
(1976).
61 673 S.W.2d at 719. Observing that "the doctrine of stare decisis does not commit
us to the sanctification of ancient fallacy," the Court rejected precedent as a limitation
on its power to act. Id. at 717.
61 Fundamental fairness has frequently been discussed in judicial adoptions of
comparative negligence. See, e.g., Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742, 752 (Iowa
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Court stated that "[a]bove all else, court-made law must be
just,'' 64 and that "the fundamental fairness of comparative neg-
ligence . . . weighs overwhelmingly in favor of the appellant.
'65
The fairness in issue was that it appears inherently wrong to
deny recovery to a plaintiff who may have been only slightly
negligent. Allowing an injured party to recover an award reduced
by that party's percentage of fault seems vastly preferable to
denying recovery altogether.66 As a result of its analysis, the
Court held: "Henceforth, where contributory negligence has
previously been a complete defense, it is supplanted by the
doctrine of comparative negligence." 67
F. Form and Application
The next issue before the court was which form of com-
parative negligence to adopt. Pure comparative negligence al-
lows a plaintiff to recover the portion of his or her damages
caused by the defendant's fault. 68 In theory, a plaintiff who
is ninety-nine percent at fault may still recover one percent of
his or her damages. 69 Modified comparative negligence allows
the plaintiff to recover damages if his fault is found to be
equal to or not greater than that of the defendant. 70 Thus, if
a jury found the plaintiff to be fifty-one percent at fault, the
plaintiff would be denied recovery.
7'
1982) ("[T]he main reason for changing . . . is fairness."); Scott v. Rizzo, 634 P.2d
1234, 1236 (N.M. 1981) (New Mexico adopts comparative negligence "in the interest of
fundamental justice"). As the California Supreme Court stated:
We are . . . persuaded that logic, practical experience, and fundamental
justice counsel against the retention of the doctrine of rendering contrib-
utory negligence a complete bar to recovery-and that it should be replaced
in this state by a system under which liability for damage will be borne by
those whose negligence caused it in direct proportion to their respective
fault.
Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1232 (Cal. 1975) (emphasis added).
673 S.W.2d at 718.
65 Id. at 719.
Id. at 720.
67 Id.
E.g., V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at § 3.2.
69 See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at § 3.2; H. WooDs, supra note 8, at § 4:1.
Prosser has pointed out that in states that have the pure system, the 99% situation does
not occur. See Prosser, supra note 23, at 494.
70 E.g., V. ScHWARTZ, supra note 8, § 3.5(B).
7 The slight-gross system, which allows the plaintiff to recover if plaintiff's neg-
ligence was slight and the defendant's negligence was gross, is considered to be a form
of comparative negligence. See V. ScHWARTZ, supra note 8, at §§ 3.4, 3.5; H. WooDs,
supra note 8, at § 4:3.
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Pure comparative negligence is almost universally favored by
legal scholars72 and the judiciary.7 Pure comparative negligence
is applied in England, Scotland, Northern Ireland, Australia,
New Zealand, and the Canadian provinces74 and is embodied in
the Uniform Comparative Fault Act.
75
Critics of the pure version of comparative negligence contend
that it favors the party with the greater amount of damages,
regardless of fault.76 This contention led the high court of West
Virginia to adopt a modified form of comparative negligence. 77
Other critics have contended that comparative negligence leads
to no fault liability which increases the cost of insurance.
78
In Hilen, the Kentucky Supreme Court noted that the mod-
ified system of comparative negligence generates a large number
of appeals79 on the "narrow question of whether plaintiff's
negligence amounted to 50% or less of the aggregate." ' 80 The
Court also recognized the criticism that modified comparative
negligence "does not abrogate contributory negligence but 'sim-
12 See, e.g., Fleming, supra note 61, at 246-50; Keeton, Comment on Maki v.
Frelk - Comparative v. Contributory Negligence: Should the Court or Legislature De-
cide?, 21 VAND. L. Rv. 906, 911 (1968); Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative
Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 YALE L.J. 697, 726-27 (1977-78).
"' Of the 10 states that have now judicially adopted comparative negligence, nine
chose the pure form of comparative negligence. Only West Virginia chose a modified
form. See 673 S.W.2d at 716 n.4 for a list of cases corresponding to the states that have
judicially adopted comparative negligence.
W' . KEETON, supra note 20, at § 67 n.16.
" For a discussion of the Act, see note 94 infra.
16 See, e.g., Humphrey, Haas & Gritzner, Comparative Negligence In Iowa - The
Time Has Come for the Iowa Supreme Court to Put Its House in Order, 31 DRAKE L.
REv. 709, 737 (1981-82).
See Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879, 885 (W. Va. 1979).
The Bradley Court stated:
[A] plaintiff who has sustained a moderate injury with a potential jury
verdict of $20,000, and who is 90 percent fault-free, may be reluctant to
file suit against a defendant who is 90 percent at fault, but who has
received severe injuries . . . [with] a potential of $800,000 in dam-
ages. . . . In this situtation, even though the defendant's verdict is reduced
by his 90 percent fault to $80,000, it is still far in excess of the plaintiff's
potential recovery of $18,000.
Id. at 883.
79 See Humphrey, Haas & Gritzner, supra note 76, at 734-35. Cf. V. SCHWARTZ,
supra note 8, at § 21.3.
19 673 S.W.2d at 719.
so Id.
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ply shifts the lottery aspects of the rule to a different ground."''
This review of the experiences of other states "[compelled the
Court] to conclude that the pure form of comparative negligence
is preferable over any of the variety of modified forms that have
been suggested.
'8 2
To implement pure comparative negligence in Kentucky, the
Court specifically adopted a portion of section two of the Uni-
form Comparative Fault Act,8 3 but "[expressed] no opinion as
to future application of any [other] portion of the Act." 4 The
Court then held "as did the Missouri court . . .and the Iowa
court . . . that the comparative negligence shall apply to: (1)
The present case; (2) All cases tried or retried after the date of
filing of this opinion; and (3) All cases pending, including ap-
peals, in which the issue has been preserved. '8 5
G. Conclusion
The adoption of comparative negligence is a desirable change.
Comparative negligence is consistent with current trends 6 in tort
law to abolish absolute bars to plaintiff's recovery8 7 and to focus
on the injured plaintiffs rights. Whether this emphasis on plain-
tiff's rights is, as some commentators have suggested, due to the
Id. (quoting Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1242 (Cal. 1975)).
82 673 S.W.2d at 719.
In applying comparative negligence in Hilen, the Court stated:
[W]e extract the following instructions from the Uniform Comparative
Fault Act, § 2 . .. for the jury to use in the event it finds both parties
at fault:
"(a) .. . the court . . . shall instruct the jury to answer special
interrogatories . . . indicating:
(1) the [total] amount of damages [the] claimant would be entitled
to recover if contributory fault is disregarded; and
(2) the percentage of the total fault . .. that is allocated to [the]
claimant [and] defendant, [the total being 100%].
(b) In determining the percentages of fault, the [jury] shall consider
both the nature of the conduct of each party at fault and the extent of
the causal relationship between the conduct and damages claimed."
We adopt only this part of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. ...
Id. at 720. See note 94 infra for a discussion of the Act.
673 S.W.2d at 720.
I Id. See also Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742, 754 (Iowa 1982); Gustafson
v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11, 15-16 (Mo. 1983).
16 See W. KEETON, supra note 20, § 67, at 471.
87 Perhaps the most important development was the abolition of the privity re-
quirement in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
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increased availability of insurance,88 or is due to other factors
such as a change in society's expectations, is beyond the scope
of this Survey.
While this adoption is extremely desirable, numerous collat-
eral issues remain undetermined. One unresolved issue is whether
to allocate a percentage of fault to an absent tortfeasor (which
would not be res judicata in subsequent proceedings) or to
compare the percentage of total fault only of those parties who
are in court.8 9 A second question of great importance for plain-
tiffs is whether the courts will continue to follow the common
law rule of joint and several liability, or whether each defendant
will be liable only for his allocated percentage of fault. 90 If the
courts do allow joint and several liability, the next question is
whether comparative contribution is to be applied. 9' Other un-
resolved issues are what effect, if any, the adoption of compar-
ative negligence will have on products liability,92 and whether
other doctrines such as last clear chance will be retained. 93
Resolution of these and other issues remains to be accom-
plished in Kentucky. Either the courts will have to resolve the
issues as they arise, or a comprehensive solution such as the
- See W. KEETON, supra note 20, § 82, at 589. For cases that cite the existence
of liability insurance as a factor in abolishing a bar to recovery, see Gibson v. Gibson,
479 P.2d 648, 653 (Cal. 1971) (parent-child immunity); Abernathy v. Sisters of St.
Mary's, 446 S.W.2d 599, 603 (Mo. 1969) (charitable immunity); Schipper v. Levitt &
Sons, Inc., 207 A.2d 314, 323 (N.J. 1965) (home builders immunity).
11 See V. ScHwARTz, supra note 8, at § 16.5; H. WOODS, supra note 8, at § 13:2;
Heft & Heft, Controversial Concepts within Comparative Negligence, 33 FED'N INS.
CouNs. Q. 49, 51-52 (1982-83).
10 California, for example, has retained joint and severable liability, while Kansas
has statutorily limited liability to the defendant's equitable share. See W. KEETON,
supra note 20, § 67, at 475; Humphrey, Haas & Gritzner, supra note 76, at 812. See
also V. ScmrARTz, supra note 8, at § 16.7; H. WOODS, supra note 8, at § 13:4.
" See H. WOODS, supra note 8, at § 13:5-:10.
92 The courts that have considered the issue have been split, with some courts
concluding that comparative negligence is incompatible with strict liability principles,
and other courts finding comparative negligence applicable. See V. ScHWARTZ, supra
note 8, at § 12.1-.7; H. WOODS, supra note 8, at § 14:49-:50. Compare Lewis v. Timco,
Inc., 697 F.2d 1252, 1254 (5th Cir. 1983) (not applicable) with Kaneko v. Hilo Coast
Processing, 654 P.2d 343, 352 (Hawaii 1982) (fairness more important, comparative
negligence is applicable).
91 See V. ScHwARTz, supra note 8, at § 7.2-.3; H. WOODS, supra note 8, at § 8:1-
:7. Compare Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886, 898 (Ii. 1981) (last clear chance abolished)
with Conner v. Mangum, 207 S.E.2d 604, 609 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974) (last clear chance
doctrine could have been applied if applicable to the facts of the case).
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Uniform Comparative Fault Act94 could be judicially adopted or
legislatively enacted. It now appears that any adoption of a
comprehensive solution will occur legislatively rather than judi-
cially. 95
II. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
A. Montgomery Elevator Co. v. McCullough'
In Montgomery Elevator Co. v. McCullough, the Kentucky
Supreme Court was afforded an opportunity to examine several
issues related to strict products liability: the scope of a manu-
facturer's duty to warn, inaction by the purchaser of the product
as a superseding cause, and the standard for determining defec-
tive condition unreasonably dangerous. 97 Ten-year old Kevin
McCullough was injured in a Shillito's Department Store when
the tennis shoe on his right foot was caught between the treads
and side skirt of an escalator. 98 He suffered a crushing, tearing
injury which resulted in the amputation of his right large toe.99
McCullough claimed that the escalator was defectively de-
signed when manufactured,100 and sought damages from both
Shillito's and the escalator manufacturer.'0 ' Although the man-
ufacturer had previously notified the store of the escalator's
propensity for causing this type of injury and had offered to
sell the store additional safety equipment, the store had not
9 The Act was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws in 1977. The Act applies the pure form of comparative negligence,
adheres to the concept of joint and severable liability and provides for contribution on
the basis of proportionate fault. Liability is apportioned only to those parties in court,
and should any one share of the obligation be uncollectible, the amount is redistributed
among the remainder. Wade, Uniform Comparative Fault Act, 14 FORUM 379 (1978-79).
The Missouri court judicially adopted the Act. Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d at 17-
27 (text and comments of the Act).
" Justice Leibson, in a concurring opinion to his own majority opinion, stated
that he would have had the Court adopt the UCFA. 673 S.W.2d at 717 (Leibson, J.,
concurring). The General Assembly has had a Uniform Comparative Fault Act before
it in the last three General Assemblies.
676 S.W.2d 776 (Ky. 1984).
Id. at 779-82.
9I Id. at 778.
99Id.
' The manufacturer had labeled the accidents the "tennis shoe" phenomenon. Id.
101 Id.
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purchased any of the additional equipment. 10 The escalator man-
ufacturer argued that the store's failure to add the suggested
safety equipment after notification of the danger was a supersed-
ing or intervening cause of the plaintiff's injuries, which relieved
the manufacturer of liability even though the escalator was de-
fective when sold.1
0 3
At trial, the jury found that the manufacturer and Shillito's
were each fifty percent responsible, and entered judgment against
the manufacturer for $25,755.87.104 Shillito's had previously set-
tled with McCullough.
0 5
The defendant appealed, claiming entitlement to a directed
verdict, as well as alleging trial errors."0 The Kentucky Court
of Appeals held the manufacturer was not entitled to a directed
verdict, but sustained its claim of trial errors. 10 7 Both parties
appealed. 108
The Supreme Court affirmed in part, holding that the man-
ufacturer was not entitled to a directed verdict,' °9 and reversed
in part, holding that any error at trial level was harmless.1' 0 The
Court dealt at length with the issue of whether Shillito's inaction,
after being specifically advised of the risk of harm and the
corrective measures needed, could be a superseding cause of the
accident."' The Court stated that such warnings "are not a
defense in the circumstances of this case where the person injured
is a member of the public, a bystander or a user without notice
of the dangerous propensities of the product.
'"" 2
1. Policy Behind Strict Products Liability
The Restatement (Second) of Torts [hereinafter referred to
as Restatement] states: "[Piublic policy demands that the burden
of accidental injuries caused by products intended for consump-
102 Id.
01 Id. at 779.
"0 Id. at 778.
,0' See id. Shillito's had paid McCullough $30,000. Id.
10 See id.
:0, Id.
'0 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
" Id. at 779-80.
,,2 Id. at 779.
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tion be placed upon those who market them, and be treated as
a cost of production against which liability insurance can be
obtained." 1 3
Manufacturers are not, however, absolute insurers of public
safety. The mere fact that a plaintiff was injured by a manufac-
turer's product will not automatically result in liability." 4 The
plaintiff must show that the product was "in a defective con-
dition unreasonably dangerous to the user" '"5 and that the defect
caused the injury.
1 6
Most commentators agree that products liability actions can
be grouped into three categories: manufacturing defects, design
defects, and defective or inadequate warnings.117 Manufacturing
defects occur where one unit or product does not conform to
the manufacturer's design." 8 An example would be a bottle of
cola that contained a rodent or other foreign matter."t 9 A design
defect occurs when, although the product conforms to the man-
ufacturer's design, the design itself is defective. 20 Perhaps the
best known example is the design defect that frequently caused
Ford Pintos to explode in rear-end collisions.' 2' Finally, the
product, while flawlessly designed and produced, may be found
M, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment c (1965).
,14 See Cox v. General Motors Corp., 514 S.W.2d 197 (Ky. 1974). Before plaintiff
can recover in a products liability action, the plaintiff must show that the defect was
the cause of harm. Id. at 200.
"I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Throughout this Survey, the
term "defect" will be used as a synonym for "defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous."
116 Id.
"I See W. KEETON, supra note 20, at § 99. See also Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test
for Design Defect: From Negligence (to Warranty) to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33
VAND. L. REV. 593, 599 (1980) (defect is used to apply to product flaws that result from
unintentional mishaps in manufacturing as well as to flaws that arise from intentional
design decisions); Keeton, The Meaning of Defect in Products Liability Law - A Review
of Basic Principles, 45 Mo. L. REv. 579, 585-88 (1980) (construction flaws, failure to
adequately warn, and defective design as bases for products liability) [hereinafter cited
as Keeton, The Meaning of Defect].
"I See W. KEETON, supra note 20, § 99, at 695; Traynor, The Ways and Meanings
of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 367 (1964-65).
1,9 See Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 111 So. 305 (Miss. 1927) (broken glass
in bottle).
120 See W. KEETON, supra note 20, § 99, at 698. See generally Vandall, "Design
Defects" in Products Liability: Rethinking Negligence and Strict Liability, 43 Omo ST.
L.J. 61 (1982); Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33 VAND.
L. REv. 551 (1980).
2I See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
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to be defective if the manufacturer fails to warn the consumer
of dangers associated with the product's use. 22 For example a
medicine which, although manufactured as intended in a pure
form, is defective if the manufacturer fails to warn of the risks
or side effects associated with the drug's use.
123
2. Defective or Inadequate Warning as a Product Defect
In Montgomery the Court addressed the manufacturer's
duty to provide users with an adequate warning of risks as-
sociated with its product. While the absence or presence of a
warning is usually an evidentiary consideration in determining
whether the product was defective, 124 the Court noted that it
had previously held: "[T]he product was unreasonably unsafe
if there was failure to provide adequate warning to the ulti-
mate user."' 125 Although some courts have held that warning
an industrial purchaser of the dangers associated with the
product fulfills the manufacturer's duties towards the pur-
chaser's employees,126 other courts have held that the manu-
facturer has a nondelegable duty to warn the actual user.' 27
In Montgomery,128 the Court adhered to the latter approach.
In W. KEEToN, supra note 20, § 99, at 697. See also Note, The Manufacturer's
Duty to Notify of Subsequent Safety Improvements, 33 STAN. L. REv. 1087 (1981). See
generally Sales, The Duty to Warn and Instruct for Safe Use in Strict Tort Liability, 13
ST. MARY's L.J. 521 (1982); Comment, Products Liability After Woodhill v. Parke
Davis: The Failure to Warn as a Basis for Recovery, 13 LoY. U. Cm. L.J. 523 (1981-
82).
I See Torsiello v. Whitehall Laboratories, 398 A.2d 132 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div.) (manufacturer may be liable for failing to specifically warn consumer of the risks
of long term consumption of analgesic; general advice to consult physician may not
suffice), cert. denied, 404 A.2d 1150 (N.J. 1979).
"A 676 S.W.2d at 781.
115 Id. (citing Post v. American Cleaning Equip. Corp., 437 S.W.2d 516, 520 (Ky.
1968)) (emphasis in original).
"1 See, e.g., Reed v. Pennwalt Corp., 591 P.2d 478 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979)
(manufacturer's warning to industrial purchaser sufficient, especially since product did
not reach employee in original container), aff'd, 604 P.2d 164 (Wash. 1979).
' See Hopkins v. Chip-In-Saw, Inc., 630 F.2d 616, 619 (8th Cir. 1980) (warnings
only given to immediate purchaser do not insulate manufacturer from liability to fore-
seeable user); Pan-Alaska Fisheries v. Marine Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129,
1137 (9th Cir. 1977) (manufacturer has a nondelegable duty to warn); Garrison v. Rohm
& Haas Co., 492 F.2d 346, 352 (6th Cir. 1974) ("under Kentucky law there is a general
duty on the part of a manufacturer to warn" user); Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines,
Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 366 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (supplier had duty to warn ultimate users
of asbestos exposure hazards); Post v. American Cleaning Equip. Corp., 437 S.W.2d
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This appears to be the better view. Having designed and
marketed the product, the manufacturer should not be allowed
to automatically shift its duty to warn to initial purchasers. As
one court stated:
To allow a manufacturer to insulate itself from liability for
harm caused by a defective product (which it built, designed
and placed into the stream of commerce) by merely sending a
single warning notice to its dealer would defeat the policy and
purpose of strict products liability which is to protect the
consumer, who is oftentimes unwary or unable to protect
himself and to place the liability on those who are responsible
for the harm and best able to absorb the loss. 129
A question left unanswered by the Kentucky Court is whether
an adequate warning which reaches the ultimate user necessarily
relieves the manufacturer of liability. The Court observed that
the warning given would be considered-along with the relative
costs of design alternatives, the feasibility of the design alter-
natives, and the product's inherent damages-in determining
whether the product is in the safest possible form.3 0 The impli-
516, 520 (Ky. 1968) (warnings delivered to industrial purchaser do not affect manufac-
turer's liability to the ultimate user and employee); Minert v. Harsco Corp., 614 P.2d
686, 691 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980) (manufacturer has a nondelegable duty to warn user).
Cf. McKee v. Moore, 648 P.2d 21, 25 (Okla. 1982) (manufacturer of drugs or prescrip-
tion devices has no duty to warn ultimate consumer, but only intermediary physician).
I' See 676 S.W.2d at 782.
"[An] adequate warning may terminate liability as to those who get the warning. But it
has no effect on those who do not get the warning except in extraordinary circumstan-
ces .. " Id. The adequacy of the warning to McCullough was not an issue in this
case, because no one argued that any warning had been received by the plaintiff. See
id. at 778-79. For a discussion of the adequacy of a warning, see Billiar v. Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co., 623 F.2d 240, 246 (2d Cir. 1980) (mild warning on label not
sufficient to convey the dangers of extremely caustic chemicals); LeBouef v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 623 F.2d 985, 989-90 (5th Cir. 1980) (warning stating special tires
needed for continuous speeds over 90 m.p.h. insufficient to convey risk of tread sepa-
ration and blowout); Sterner v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Paper, Inc., 519 F.2d 1352
(8th Cir. 1975) (although manufacturer had labeled product with large printed warnings,
jury question present as to adequacy of warning); Michael v. Warner/Chilcott, 579 P.2d
183, 187 (N.M. 1978) (not only was warning potentially not sufficient, but lettering was
so small as to require a magnifying glass); Post v. American Cleaning Equip. Corp.,
437 S.W.2d 516 (Ky. 1968) ("[I]t may be doubted that a sign warning, 'Keep off the
Grass,' could be deemed sufficient to apprise a reasonable person that the grass was
infested with deadly snakes." Id. at 520).
19 565 F.2d at 1137.
676 S.W.2d at 780-81.
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cation is that merely giving an adequate warning will not always
avoid liability.
1 31
3. Defective Design
The trial court found for McCullough based on his claim of
defective design of the escalator. 32 McCullough introduced evi-
dence tending to prove that a safer escalator was being produced
at the same time as the defective one 33 and evidence of numerous
similar accidents involving tennis shoes.1 34 Additionally, the man-
ufacturer had failed to warn McCullough and other users of the
escalator's risks.1
35
The Supreme Court reviewed the present state of the law
and stated: "The shift is from the conduct of the actor, which
is the problem in negligence cases, to the condition of the
product."'136 The Court reiterated that in determining whether a
product is defective, Kentucky applies the formula contained in
the Restatement. 37 This is the "defective condition unreasonably
dangerous' '1 38 standard which is accepted in the majority of
M The absence or presence of a warning is an evidentiary consideration in deter-
mining whether or not the product is defective. See id. at 781. However, when a safer
feasible product is available, permitting a manufacturer to limit or terminate liability
merely by giving notice seems to defeat the principle of products liability by allowing
the manufacturer either to define the scope of its liability or to escape liability altogether.
The Supreme Court of California discussed this refusal to allow a manufacturer to
define its own liability in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal.
1962): "[T]he refusal to permit the manufacturer to define the scope of its own respon-
sibility for defective products . . . make[s] clear that the liability is not one governed
by the law of contract but by the law of strict liability in tort." Id. at 901 (citations
omitted). See also L. FRUMER & M. FPEDMAN, PRODUCTS LiABiLrrT § 5A.04(1) (1960).
1-12 676 S.W.2d at 778.
1" Id.
14 Id. at 783. On appeal, the manufacturer claimed that introduction of this
evidence, concerning many occurrences throughout the United States, constituted an
error. The Court stated that "evidence of similar product failures under similar condi-
tions is relevant and admissible." Id. The evidentiary implications of Montgomery
Elevator are discussed more fully in Fowler, Kentucky Law Survey-Evidence, 73 Ky.
L.J. 407, 407-11 (1984-85).
" 676 S.W.2d at 779.
"4 Id. at 780.
-1 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)).
"-,, Section 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965) states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
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jurisdictions.1 39 The term "defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous" has been criticized as placing too great a burden on the
plaintiff,' 40 and has been replaced in several jurisdictions with
the "not reasonably safe test' '1 41 or simply the "defective con-
dition" standard. 42 However, the Montgomery Court reaffirmed
that "[t]he four key words are 'defective condition unreasonably
dangerous."1
43
a. Determination of Defective Condition
Unreasonably Dangerous
The standard for determining whether or not a product is in
a defective condition unreasonably dangerous was set out by the
Supreme Court of Kentucky in Nichols v. Union Underwear
Co., Inc.'44 In Nichols, the Court rejected the consumer expec-
tation test, 45 which focuses on whether the product is more
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
See Schwartz, The Concepts of "Defective Condition" and "Unreasonably
Dangerous" in Products Liability Law, 66 MARQ. L. Rav. 280, 287-90 (1982-83). For a
general discussion of the development and current problems of defining a defect, see
Elfin, The Changing Philosophy of Products Liability and the Proposed Model Uniform
Act, 19 AM. Bus. L.J. 267, 286-90 (1981-82); Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning
of Defect, 5 ST. MARY's L.J. 30 (1973-74); Vandall, supra note 120; Wade, Strict Tort
Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965).
140 See, e.g., Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1162 (Cal. 1972) ("We
think that a requirement that a plaintiff also prove that the defect made the product
'unreasonably dangerous' places upon him a significantly increased burden and represents
a step backward in the area pioneered by this court.").
14, See, e.g., Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 406 A.2d 140, 153 (N.J.
1979); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 542 P.2d 774, 779 (Wash. 1975); Morningstar
v. Black & Decker Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 683 (W. Va. 1979).
141 Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 46 (Alaska
1976) (in personal injury cases); Luque v. McLean, 501 P.2d 1163 (Cal. 1972) (in products
liability case).
,13 See 676 S.W.2d at 780.
-- 602 S.W.2d 429 (Ky. 1980).
"4 See id. at 432.
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dangerous than the consumer expected. 146 The Court instead
adopted the prudent manufacturer test, 147 which focuses on
whether a prudent manufacturer, aware of the qualities, char-
acteristics, and actual condition of the product would place the
product on the market. 48 However, in Montgomery, the Court
declared that the trier of fact could also consider such factors
as "feasibility of making a safer product, patency of the danger,
warnings and instructions, subsequent maintenance and repair,
misuse, and the products' inherently unsafe characteristics.' 1 49
These factors are associated with the risk-utility test. The
risk-utility test asks the fact finder to determine whether the
risks the product poses outweigh the benefits it provides. 1" 0 Al-
though these factors are similar to a negligence test,' it is
important to keep in mind that the Court's emphasis is on the
condition of the product as opposed to the culpability of the
manufacturer.1
2
b. Was the Escalator Defective?
The dissent in Montgomery protested that there had been no
showing that the escalator was defective: 153 "In normal use, the
equipment is not dangerous at all.' ' 5 4 This statement could have
been made about many products liability cases in which the
plaintiff eventually recovered. 5 The dissent failed to appreciate
"6 See W. KEETON, supra note 20, § 99, at 698; Birnbaum, supra note 117, at 611-
18.
'47 See 602 S.W.2d at 433.
141 See Birnbaum, supra note 117, at 618-30; Jenkins & Green, Kentucky Law
Survey-Torts, 69 Ky. L.J. 663, 664-71 (1980-81); Comment, Nichols v. Union Under-
wear Co. and the Meaning of "Unreasonably Dangerous". A Call for a More Precise
Standard, 69 Ky. L.J. 419, 430-34 (1980-81).
"1 676 S.W.2d at 780.
110 See W. KEETON, supra note 20, § 99, at 699; Birnbaum, supra note 117, at 631-
35.
151 Vandall, supra note 120, at 74.
1 See 676 S.W.2d at 780.
"I' See Montgomery Elevator Co. v. McCullough, 676 S.W.2d at 784 (Stephenson,
J., dissenting).
Id.
"' See, e.g., LeBouef v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 623 F.2d 985 (5th Cir.
1980) (manufacturer liable for tire blowouts caused by speeds in excess of 100 m.p.h.
where speeding forseeable); Steinmetz v. Bradbury Co., 618 F.2d 21 (8th Cir. 1980)
(manufacturer liable where forseeable that operator's hands would be placed on moving
rollers).
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that a manufacturer is also liable for foreseeable misuse of its
product.
The Kentucky Supreme Court had previously held that a
manufacturer is responsible for the accidents that occur both
from normal use and from foreseeable misuse, as the manufac-
turer may reasonably anticipate that its product will be used in
certain ways. 56 In Montgomery, the Court held that a manufac-
turer "is presumed to know the qualities and characteristics, and
the actual condition, of his product at the time he sells it. . . .. 5
The question for the finder of fact is: Would a prudent manu-
facturer, knowing that there will be a certain number of similar
accidents, nevertheless place this type of product on the mar-
ket? 5
8
In Montgomery, the manufacturer knew of previous tennis
shoes accidents and was presumed to know the condition of its
escalator and that other accidents would likely occur. Consid-
ering that a safer escalator was being manufactured at the same
time and that the manufacturer failed to warn Kevin Mc-
Cullough, it would appear that there was ample evidence to
support the trial court's finding that the escalator was defective
when sold.
4. Superseding Cause
In Montgomery, the manufacturer asserted that Shillito's
failure to act after it had warned Shillito's of the danger con-
stituted a superseding cause of the accident which would relieve
it of all liability.' 59 Generally, if the purchaser of a product, or
other intermediary, has altered the manufacturer's product, or
committed certain actions or inactions, those actions may con-
stitute a superseding cause that relieves the manufacturer of
liability.' 60 The Montgomery Court reiterated that the basic law
15 See Ulrich v. Kasco Abrasives Co., 532 S.W.2d 197, 200 (Ky. 1976).
"' 676 S.W.2d at 780.
138 See id. The finder of fact may consider the feasibility of making a safer product,
the obviousness of the danger, the warnings that were or could have been placed on the
product, and the product's inherent dangers. See id. The fact finder may also look at
whether a safer product is being manufacturered at the same time. See id. at 778.
1 9 676 S.W.2d at 779.
11o See IA L. FRUMER & M. FtIED ., supra note 131, at § 11.04[1].
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on superseding cause in Kentucky is found in the Restatement:'16
"A superseding cause is an act of a third person or other force
which by its intervention prevents the action from being liable
for harm to another which his antecedent negligence is a sub-
stantial factor in bringing about."1 62
The Court quoted the section of the Restatement dealing
with a third party's inaction: "[T]he failure of a third person to
act to prevent harm to another threatened by the actor's negli-
gent conduct is not a superseding cause of such harm with rare
exceptions." 1 63 To constitute a superseding cause, the action or
inaction must be "extraordinary rather than normal' 64or "highly
extraordinary' ' '65 in nature.
In Montgomery, the manufacturer relied on Bohnert Equip-
ment Co., Inc. v. Kendall,166 which had held that the purchaser's
inaction could be an intervening cause. 67 In Bohnert, the man-
ufacturer alleged that, after it had warned the purchaser's plant
engineer of the problem and the steps needed to correct the
problem, the engineer had assured the manufacturer the problem
would be corrected. 168 The Montgomery Court stated that the
issue in Bohnert was whether the purchaser had assumed re-
sponsibility for the repair. 69 The Court added: "So much of the
Bohnert opinion as is subject to broader interpretation, is in
conflict with this underlying principle [of strict liability] and is
overruled."
170
5. Conclusion
The Court's holding in Montgomery Elevator Co. v. Mc-
Cullough that a manufacturer is not relieved of liability when it
warns the intermediary purchaser, rather than the ultimate user,
161 See 676 S.W.2d at 779-80.
163 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 440 (1965).
63 See 676 S.W.2d at 780 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 452(1)
(1965)).
-6 Id. (quoting House v. Kellerman, 519 S.W.2d 380, 382 (Ky. 1974)).
165 Id.
16 569 S.W.2d 161 (Ky. 1978) (overruled by Montgomery Elevator Co. v. Mc-
Cullough, 672 S.W.2d 776 (Ky. 1984)).
167 676 S.W.2d at 779.
16 569 S.W.2d at 166.
169 676 S.W.2d at 781-82.
110 Id. at 782.
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is a sound decision. The case is consistent with the stated policy
of products liability and with the case law of Kentucky and other
jurisdictions. Although the case does not appear to break any
new ground, the decision is valuable for its discussion and clar-
ification of the issues of superseding cause, a manufacturer's
duty to warn the ultimate consumer, and for its review and
affirmation of the standard for determining when a product is
in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous.
B. American Motors Corp. v. Addington
American Motors Corp. (AMC) v. Addington17' was a prod-
ucts liability action concerning both a failure to warn consumers
of the Jeep CF-5's propensity to roll over'7 and false advertising
of the Jeep's capabilities.
1 73
Induced by television ads that showed a Jeep "being operated
in rough terrain, jumping in the air and landing on all four
wheels," Mr. and Mrs. Addington purchased an AMC Jeep CJ-
5.174 Mrs. Addington was subsequently injured when the Jeep
wrecked while heading into a curve on an icy road. 175 Although
there was a factual dispute as to the manner in which the
accident had occurred, 76 it was clear that the Jeep did end up
on its side, severely injuring Mrs. Addington.
77
The court held that AMC's failure to warn consumers about
the Jeep's propensity to roll over constituted a defect. 78 According
171 No. 82-CA-2624-MR (Ky. Ct. App. April 16, 1984), modified, 31 KLS 10, at
20 (July 13, 1984).
172 See id. slip op. at 5.
'13 See id. slip op. at 10-11.
174 Id. slip op. at 2. Other courts have dealt differently with consumer reliance on
the manufacturer's advertising. Compare Haynes v. American Motors Corp., 691 F.2d
1268, 1271 (8th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff not allowed to testify that commercials influenced
him to buy a Jeep CJ-5), with Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 424 N.E.2d 568,
579-80 (Ohio 1981) (court relied on manufacturer's willfully suggestive campaign and on
manufacturer's knowledge of test results to affirm an award of $1.1 million in punitive
damages).
"I No. 82-CA-2624-MR, slip op. at 3.
176 See id., slip op. at 9.
177 See id., slip op. at 5.
171 See id., slip op. at 10. The Jeep is constructed with a high ground clearance, a
high center of gravity, a short base and a narrow track width. Although apparently
appropriate for an off-road vehicle, these characteristics do create a propensity to roll
over. Only the manufacturer, not the consumer, would be likely to have knowledge of
this type of nonobvious defect. See id.
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to the court, "[t]he law's purpose in imposing a duty to warn
users of a product is that with the advances of technology the
ordinary person is not aware of potential harm unless specifically
advised about it. This potential harm can result even if the
product is flawlessly made.'
' 79
Additionally, the court held that Mrs. Addington could re-
cover for her bodily injuries under Kentucky's Consumer Pro-
tection Act if the jury believed the Jeep advertisement was
misleading or deceptive.8 0
The court specifically adopted the language of Restatement
section 388 comment b'8 1 which states:
This Section states that one who supplies a chattel for another
to use for any purpose is subject to liability for physical harm
caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care to give to
those whom he may expect to use the chattel any information
as to the character and condition of the chattel which he
possesses, and which he should recognize as necessary to enable
them to realize the danger of using it. A fortiori, one so
supplying a chattel is subject to liability if by word or deed he
leads those who are to use the chattel to believe it to be of a
character or in a condition safer for use than he knows it to
be or to be likely to be.1
8 2
The court then remanded the case for retrial with proper
consideration in the jury instructions of both section 388 com-
ment b and the defendant's theory of the cause of the accident. 83
17' Id.
11 See id., slip op. at 13-14. The Consumer Protection Act is codified at KRS §
367.170. The relevant portion of the Act provides: "Unlawful Acts. (1) Unfair, false,
misleading or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are
hereby declared unlawful. (2) For the purposes of this secion, unfair shall be construed
to mean unconscionable." KRS § 367.170 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
"I See No. 82-CA-2624-MR, slip op. at 18.
182 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 comment b (1965). This holding is also
consistent with § 402B which states:
One engaged in the business of selling chattels who, by advertising, labels,
or otherwise, makes to the public a misrepresentation of a material fact
concerning the character or quality of a chattel sold by him is subject to
liability for physical harm to a consumer of the chattel caused by justifiable
reliance upon the misrepresentation, even though (a) it is not made fraud-
ulently or negligently, and (b) the consumer has not bought the chattel
from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402B (1965).
M See No. 82-CA-2624-MR, slip op. at 18.
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III. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND APPARENT AUTHORITY
A. The Doctrine of Apparent Authority
Historically, a hospital could only be held liable for the
negligent acts of employees or agents under the theory of res-
pondeat superior. 184 This form of vicarious liability could be
imposed only if the employee or agent was in fact employed by
the hospital and was acting within the scope of the employee's
duties.'"" This limited theory of liability effectively insulated
hospitals from liability for a private physician's or independent
contractor's negligent acts, no matter how gross the negligence. 86
Dissatisfaction with this lack of responsibility on a hospital's
part led courts to develop new theories of hospital liability, such
as the doctrines of apparent authority187 and corporate liability.'8
In Williams v. St. Claire Medical Center,'89 the Kentucky Court
of Appeals adopted the doctrine of apparent authority.
1. Williams v. St. Claire Medical Center
In Williams, the plaintiff Delbert Williams entered St. Claire
Medical Center (St. Claire) for knee surgery.190 The day prior to
his surgery Ed Johnson, a nurse anesthetist, met with Williams
to determine what anesthetic to use in his surgery.' 9'
Williams did not know Johnson was employed by a local
medical clinic rather than by St. Claire.'92 Johnson, a recent
graduate of a nurse anesthetist program, had not yet obtained
"I "Respondeat superior" means "[lI]et the master answer." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1179 (5th ed. 1979). Under this doctrine the employer is liable for the
employee's negligent acts. See W. KEETON, supra note 20, at § 69.
"I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AcENCY § 219 (1957).
116 See, e.g., Mayers v. Litow, 316 P.2d 351, 354 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (hospital
could not be liable for allegedly negligent thyroidectomy 'where physicians were inde-
pendent contractors).
'1' See notes 204-17 infra and accompanying text.
'" See notes 218-25 infra and accompanying text.
11 657 S.W.2d 590 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983). See also Paintsville Hospital v. Rose, 84-
SC-14-DG, 32 KLS 1, at 19 (Ky. Jan. 17, 1985) (ostensible agency applied where
physician who was not employed by the hospital furnished treatment in the emergency
room, which was open to the public).
19 657 S.W.2d at 591.
, Id. at 592.
See id. at 591.
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certification as a nurse anesthetist. 93 The morning Johnson an-
esthetized Williams, neither Johnson's supervisor nor a physician
were in the room as required by St. Claire's published proce-
dures. 194 Williams was noted to be in distress about twenty
minutes after the anesthesia was begun. Despite resuscitation
measures, Williams remained in a coma for ten to twelve days
and suffered massive brain damage. 19
5
2. Hospital's Liability Under the
Rule of Respondeat Superior
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, St. Claire could
probably not be held liable for the negligence of an independent
contractor such as Johnson. 96 To impose liability under this
theory, there must be a master-servant relationship, and the
servant must be acting within the scope of the servant's duties.' 97
Under this rationale, a hospital would seldom be held liable
for the negligent acts of medical personnel not directly employed
by it.11 As an additional bar, for many years courts held that a
physician's "professional skills" precluded the finding that the
physician was a servant of the hospital, because the hospital did
not intrude on the doctor's skill and judgment. 99 This theory
was first rejected in 1957.200 Gradually a two-pronged test de-
veloped for determining whether the hospital controlled the
193 Id.
,14 Id. at 592.
9, Id. at 591-92.
'6 Under a strict application of respondeat superior, Johnson was not a servant of
St. Claire. To be a servant, one's conduct and actions must be controlled or subject to
the control of the master. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1957).
'1 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1179 (5th ed. 1979). Perhaps the most well-known
example of a servant not within the scope of duties is the "frolic and detour" exception,
where the servant has strayed from assigned business to pursue activities on the servant's
own behalf. The master is then typically not liable. See W. KEETON, supra note 20, §
70, at 503-05.
' See Comment, The Hospital-Physician Relationship: Hospital Responsibility for
Malpractice of Physicians, 50 WASH. L. REv. 385, 396-97 (1975).
I9 See, e.g., Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914). In
Schloendorff, the court held the hospital could not be liable where physicians are
independent contractors merely using the hospital as a facility. Id. at 93.
29' See Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 9 (N.Y. 1957). In Bing a nurse negligently
failed to remove an operating linen saturated with flammable antiseptic. An electric
cautery used during the surgery caught the linen on fire, burning the plaintiff. Id. at 3-
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physician or other medical personnel. 20 1 If (1) the patient sought
treatment from the hospital rather than from the physician, and
(2) the physician was a salaried employee of the hospital, the
hospital could be found to be the employer and thus liable.
20 2
Several courts extended this test to cover medical personnel who,
though generally viewed as independent contractors, receive a
percentage of the hospital's profits for the services they pro-
vide. 2 3
3. The Doctrine of Apparent Authority
Today, more and more hospital services are being performed
by various nonemployee contractors. 2° The typical hospital pa-
tient requires a wide range of hospital services from a variety of
personnel. The patient expects these services to be performed
competently. To the patient, an independent contractor is usually
indistinguishable from a hospital employee.20 5 The Williams court
recognized the inequity of insulating the hospital from liability
in this situation, and held the hospital could be liable under the
doctrine of apparent authority or ostensible agency. 2°6
Apparent authority originated in the 1955 California case,
Seneris v. Haas,27 and has been applied in numerous jurisdic-
101 The first case to elucidate the two-pronged test appears to have been Brown v.
La Societe Francaise de Bienfaisance Mutuelle, 71 P. 516 (Cal. 1903).
m0 Comment, supra note 198, at 393, 401. Typically, under this test, if the patient
enters the hospital's emergency room and is seen by a physician who is employed on
any type basis by the hospital, then the hospital can be held liable. See Schagrin v.
Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 304 A.2d 61, 64-65 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973).
203 See, e.g., Newton County Hospital v. Nickolson, 207 S.E.2d 659 (Ga. Ct. App.
1974).
See Southwick, Hospital Liability: Two Theories Have Been Merged, 4 J. LEGA.
MED. 1, 9 (1983).
101 See id. at 10.
206 Williams v. St. Claire Medical Center, 657 S.W.2d 590, 596 (Ky. Ct. App.
1983). See generally Stanczyk & Moffitt, Hospitals, Physicians, and Their Liability
Carriers: Ostensible Authority, Enterprise Liability, and Beyond, 31 FED'N INS. COUNS.
Q. 199 (1981); Zaremski & Spitz, Liability of a Hospital as an Institution: Are the Walls
of Jericho Tumbling?, 16 FORUM 225 (1980); Note, Judicial Recognition of Hospital
Independent Duty of Care to Patients: Hannola v. City of Lakewood, 30 CLEV. ST. L.
R V. 711 (1981).
20 291 P.2d 915 (Cal. 1955). Seneris also dealt with an allegation of negligently
administered anesthesia where the anesthesiologist was not a hospital employee. See id.
at 926-27.
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tions since then. 208 Under this doctrine, having "held out" to
the patient that the contractor was a hospital employee, the
hospital is now liable for the contractor's negligence. 2°9 Courts
applying the doctrine of apparent authority frequently inquire
into whether the patient justifiably relied upon the representation
that the contractor was a hospital employee. 210 The California
court in Seneris reasoned that the plaintiff could not be required
to determine whether each person who attended her was a hos-
pital employee or an independent contractor. It was enough that
she reasonably believed she was being treated by hospital em-
ployees, that such belief was generated by the act or neglect of
the hospital, and that she was in no way negligent. 21' Once it
has been determined that the doctrine of apparent authority
applies, then the hospital may be liable for any tortious act
committed within the scope of the independent contractor's du-
ties, just as if the contractor were truly an employee.
212
The Williams case presented very sympathetic facts for the
adoption of the doctrine of apparent authority. Mr. Williams
had every reason to believe that his anesthetist was a hospital
employee and under the supervision and control of the hospital.
Because Mr. Williams had no reason to suspect Johnson was an
independent contractor, the hospital should have been estopped
from asserting otherwise.
"I See, e.g., Grewe v. Mt. Clemens Gen. Hosp., 273 N.W.2d 429, 433-35 (Mich.
1978) (hospital may be liable under theory of agency by estoppel); Lundberg v. Bay
View Hosp., 191 N.E.2d 821, 823 (Ohio 1963) (hospital represented and induced belief
that physician was an employee, allowing jury to find physician to be an agent by
estoppel). See also Southwick, supra note 204, at 10.
"I See, e.g., Seneris v. Haas, 291 P.2d 915. The California court defined apparent
authority (or ostensible agency-the terms are used interchangably) as where "the
principal intentionally, or by want of ordinary care, causes a third person to believe
another to be his agent who is not really employed by him." Id. at 927 (quoting
Stanhope v. Los Angeles College of Chiropractic, 128 P.2d 705, 708 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1942)). See also Williams v. St. Claire Medical Center, 657 S.W.2d at 596.
210 See, e.g., Vanaman v. Milford Memorial Hosp., 272 A.2d 718 (Del. 1970)
(hospital is liable if it caused the plaintiff to justifiably rely on the representation that
the defendant physician was employed by it).
21 291 P.2d at 927.
211 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoN.D) OF AGENCY § 267 (1957). If the hospital's liability
is based on agency by estoppel, then the hospital's liability can be neither more nor less
broad than its liability for an actual employee.
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4. Hospital's Duty To Enforce Its Own Policies
for the Benefit of All Patients
Additionally, the court held that the hospital could be liable
for failing to enforce its own policies for Williams' benefit. 3
This appears to be an entirely reasonable duty. The court held
that both staff employees and independent contractors must
exercise appropriate care for a patient whether that patient is
classified as a private patient2 4 or a hospital patient. 21 5 This
exercise of appropriate care includes enforcing the hospital's own
policies.21 6 The court stated: "A breach of this duty may expose
the hospital to liability in tort. Any lesser rule would be insen-
sible to the true role of a hospital as an institution in present
day society.
' 217
5. Corporate Liability
A related issue not addressed by the Williams court is whether
a hospital can be held liable for the negligent acts of medical
personnel who are clearly not hospital employees. Here, the
doctrine of apparent authority would not apply. An example
would be the hospital's referral of the patient to a private
physician who has staff privileges at the hospital. Numerous
jurisdictions have held the hospital can be liable under the theory
of corporate liability,218 if the hospital has failed to exercise
adequate care in selecton, retention, or supervision of a physician
23 See Williams v. St. Claire Medical Center, 657 S.W.2d 590, 592-95 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1983).
214 The hospital had argued not only that it had no duty to supervise Johnson, but
also that it had no duties to Williams who was a private patient rather than a patient
of the hospital. See id. at 592-95.
211 See id. at 597.
216 Id. at 594.
217 Id. at 597.
,"I See, e.g., Tucson Medical Center, Inc. v. Misevch, 545 P.2d 958, 959-60 (Ariz.
1976) (cause of action allowed against hospital for alleged negligence in supervising
anesthesiologist); Kitto v. Gilbert, 570 P.2d 544, 550 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977) (jury allowed
to decide whether hospital negligent in maintaining anesthesiologist on staff); Gridley v.
Johnson, 476 S.W.2d 475, 484-85 (Mo. 1972) (hospital may be liable for doctor's breach
of duty). See generally Goldberg, The Duty of Hospitals and Hospital Medical Staffs
to Regulate the Quality of Patient Care: A Legal Perspective, 14 PAc. L.J. 55 (1982);
Loveridge & Kimball, Hospital Corporate Negligence Comes to California: Questions in
the Wake of Elam v. College Park Hospital, 14 PAc. L.J. 803, 809 n.47 (1983);
Southwick, supra note 204 at 17.
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or other independent contractor.2 1 9 Corporate liability is prem-
ised on the independent duty a hospital owes a patient to provide
competent medical care? 02
The jurisdictions that apply corporate liability recognize that
hospitals do control areas such as granting of staff privileges,
enforcement of hospital precedures, and review of medical pro-
cedures. 22' While the doctrine of corporate liability may appear
to apply to a broader range of cases than the doctrine of ap-
parent authority, its application is limited by the requirement
that the hospital either know or have reason to know of the
contractor's incompetence.2
6. Conclusion
The adoption of the doctrine of apparent authority was a
positive and needed step. The doctrine is more compatible with
the needs and expectations of a hospital patient than is an
unbending rule of nonliability. Additionally, in Williams the
court may have indicated a willingness to consider corporate
liability in the proper factual situation. The court noted that a
hospital does owe a duty to exercise appropriate care for a
patient's well-being. 223 This duty could be extended to require
appropriate care in hiring and supervision of medical personnel.
The court did hold that a hospital may breach a duty to a
patient by failing to enforce its own rules and regulations, 224 but
specifically noted that the issue in the case was "not the duty
to supervise or review the medical treatment given [the pa-
tient]. '"'2 Apparently the adoption or rejection of corporate
liability must await a ripe factual situation.
219 See Note, Tort Law-Corporate Negligence of Hospitals and the Duty to Mon-
itor and Oversee Medical Treatment- Bost v. Riley, 17 WAKE FoluasT L. Rv. 309,
317-20 (1981).
See Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (I11.
1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966). Darling is regarded as the genesis of corporate
liability. Goldberg, supra note 218, at 56.
"I Note, supra note 219, at 317.
See id. at 320-21.
2" See Williams v. St. Claire Medical Center, 657 S.W.2d 590, 597 (Ky. Ct. App.
1983).
22 See id. at 594-95.
"I Id. at 594.
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B. Compensation for Future Mental Suffering
In Davis v. Graviss,226 the Supreme Court of Kentucky dealt
with the issue of whether a plaintiff could recover for "future
harm and for mental suffering and impairment of earning power
resulting from the fear caused by the increased risk of future
harm. "227
Sandra Davis Litten was injured in an auto collision. She
suffered various injuries, including a basilar skull fracture which
was termed "potentially devastating. 2 28 One physician had ad-
vised her to have corrective surgery. A second physician had
cautioned that the surgery was too perilous to attempt.229 At
trial, Litten's experts testified she would probably experience
episodes "of cerebral spinal fluid leakage . . . [and possibly]
meningitis, brain abscess or other neurological problems.''2O
The trial court awarded Litten $390,000.00 for present and
future mental and physical suffering and for permanent impair-
ment of earning power. 231 The court of appeals reversed, holding
that a plaintiff could not be compensated for future complica-
tions that are "speculative. '232 The Kentucky Supreme Court
reversed and reinstated the trial court decision.
233
The Court cited existing Kentucky case law that had allowed
damages where the mental suffering was not related to physical
pain,234 where the injury was a phobic reaction of the mind,235
and where fear of future consequences caused a woman to
21 672 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1984).
Id. at 930 (emphasis in original). Cf. Blair v. Buksnys, 521 S.W.2d 652, 656
(Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (failure to make an award for future pain and future mental
suffering was manifestly unjust in light of the facts); Lofgren v. Western Wash. Corp.
of Seventh Day Adventists, 396 P.2d 139, 143 (Wash. 1964) (prejudicial error not to
instruct the jury as to present and future mental pain). See generally 3 PERSONAL INJURY
§ 3.04[31[b]-[c] (L. Frumer, R. Benoit & M. Friedman 1965 & Supp. 1984).
211 See Davis v. Graviss, 672 S.W.2d at 929.
229 Id.
2" Id.
"I Id. at 930.
232 Id. at 929-30.
21 See id. at 933.
2- See id. at 930 (citing Wilson v. Redken Laboratories, Inc., 562 S.W.2d 633 (Ky.
1978) (plaintiff suffered mental anguish from permanent damage to hair)).
23 See 672 S.W.2d at 930 (citing Murray v. Lawson, 441 S.W.2d 136 (Ky. 1969)
(plaintiff had physically recovered from injury but suffered a disabling phobic reaction)).
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undergo a therapeutic abortion.2 6 The Court noted: "Thus, we
have previously recognized the right to substantial damages for
mental suffering not directly related to physical pain. .... ,,217
The Court then addressed whether "enhanced or created suscep-
tibility" of developing a future condition or disease was com-
pensible.2 18 An example would be where a blow to the head
creates an increased risk of future epilepsy. 2 9 The Court held
"where there is substantial evidence of probative value to sup-
port it, the jury may consider and compensate for the increased
likelihood of future complications. Where, as here, that likeli-
hood initiates serious mental distress, this also is compensa-
ble."m
In specifically recognizing future mental distress, the Court
made what appears to be a conceptually sound decision. Mental
suffering is as real to the victim as physical suffering. With the
requirement of substantial evidence of probative value, plaintiffs
do not receive a windfall but instead are more fully compensated
for actual damages.
IV. FmAMN's RULE
In Fletcher v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Co.241 the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals held the fireman's rule242 applicable
to police officers acting in the line of duty:243 "[P]olicemen,
as well as firemen, must be deemed to assume all normal risks
inherent in their employment.' 2 4
236 See 672 S.W.2d at 931 (citing Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141 (Ky. 1980)
(physician negligently x-rayed pregnant woman, causing her to seek a therapeutic abor-
tion out of fear of harm to fetus)).
23 672 S.W.2d at 931.
23 See id.
"I See id. (citing McCall v. United States, 206 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1962);
Schwegel v. Goldberg, 228 A.2d 405 (Pa. 1967)).
14 672 S.W.2d at 932.
-1 679 S.W.2d 240 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
2z1 For more on the fireman's rule, see generally 1 J. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW
§ 19.07 (1982 & Supp. 1983); Note, Landowners' Liability to Injured Firefighters in
Illinois-Washington v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 DE PAUL L. Rv. 137 (1977); Com-
ment, The New Minnesota Fireman's Rule- An Application of the Assumption of Risk
Doctrine: Armstrong v. Mailand, 64 MINN. L. REv. 878 (1980).
3 See 679 S.W.2d at 241.
I Id. at 243.
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Kentucky adopted the fireman's rule in 1964 in Buren v.
Midwest Industries, Inc.245 The Court stated:
[A]s a general rule the owner or occupant [of land] is not
liable for having negligently created the condition necessitating
the fireman's presence (that is, the fire itself), but may be
liable for failure to warn of unusual or hidden hazards, for
actively negligent conduct and, in some jurisdictions, for sta-
tutory violations [creating extraordinary riiks] .... 246
The fireman's rule is applied in the majority of states,
247
regardless of whether the fireman is considered an invitee2 4s or
licensee.249 Kentutcky ignores these classifications of entrants onto
land and, instead, holds that the fireman is sui generis. 20 How-
ever, it is the principle of assumed risk and not the classification
of the fireman that mandates the rule of nonliability. 251 An
additional justification is that once the officer arrives on the
scene, the landowner has very little control over the officer's
actions.
25 2
A. Application in Fletcher
In Fletcher, the plaintiff was a state trooper called to the
scene of a train derailment. 253 Vinyl chloride fumes escaping
from punctured tank cars caused Trooper Fletcher "serious
-5 380 S.W.2d 96 (Ky. 1964).
21 Id. at 97.
247 See J. DooLEY, supra note 242 at § 19.07.
See, e.g., Strong v. Seattle Stevedore Co., 466 P.2d 545, 549 (Wash. Ct. App.
1970) (fireman was an invitee under the economic benefit test).
24 See, e.g., Pallikan v. Mark, 322 N.E.2d 398, 399 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975) (fireman
was a licensee and took all risks of the premises).
1' See Buren v. Midwest Indus., Inc., 380 S.W.2d at 98. Sui generis is defined as
being "[o]f its own kind or class; i.e., the only one of its own kind; peculiar." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1286 (5th ed. 1979).
2' 679 S.W.2d at 242-43. Note, however, that Kentucky expressly abolished the
assumption of risk defense in Parker v. Redden, 421 S.W.2d 586, 592 (Ky. 1967).
KRS § 61.315 (Cum. Supp. 1984) provides that the spouse of a police officer or fireman
killed in the line of duty is entitled to death benefits of $25,000.00. Two questions are
raised: (1) Should all taxpayers be liable (through the use of their tax money) when a
single landowner's negligence kills a fireman or police officer?; (2) In light of an officer's
assumedly regular pay, can the officer truly be said to have assumed the risk of death
or maiming?
2S2 380 S.W.2d at 99.
"I See 679 S.W.2d at 241-42.
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personal injuries. 25 4 The train derailment was allegedly due to
the railroad's negligence. 255
In the resulting negligence action, the trial court granted the
defendant railroad company's motion for summary judgment,
based on the application of the fireman's rule .2 6 The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision 257 and the Kentucky Supreme Court
denied discretionary review.5 8
B. Discussion
Although public policy is cited as the basis for the fireman's
rule, there appears to be little justification for denying recovery
in the face of violation of safety statutes. 259 Public policy would
seem to urge the enforcement of safety statutes for the benefit
of all persons.3 Anomalous results would occur where an officer
and a utilities meter-reader were both injured by a landowner's
violation of safety statute. 261 Although the officer would not
have a cause of action, the utilities employee would be able to
prove negligence per se 262 and readily recover.
It is true that firemen and police officers are paid for the
work they do. However, the policy behind denying these public
servants recovery in the face of a landowner's negligence, espe-
cially where a safety statute has been violated, appears suspect.
The Kentucky courts or legislature should reexamine the fire-
man's rule and determine if this rule of nonliability is justifiable.
I d. at 242.
2I5 Id. at 241-42.
I5 d. at 242.
27 Id. at 241.
2-8 See id. at 240.
"I See Clark v. Corby, 249 N.W.2d 567, 571-72 (Wis. 1977) (land owner may be
held liable for injury to fireman when injury caused by violation of safety statues
intended to protect firemen).
uO See Note, supra note 242, at 148-49.
26' Buren expressly held that a fireman could not recover on the facts of the case
where a landowner had violated a safety statute. See Buren v. Midwest Indus., Inc., 380
S.W.2d at 98-99.
- The rule in Kentucky is that a safety statute violation resulting in an injury of
the type the statute was meant to prevent is negligence per se. See Blue Grass Restaurant
Co. v. Franklin, 424 S.W.2d 594, 597 (Ky. 1968).
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